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THE AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
SYSTEM: A MODEL FOR TRANSNATIONAL
ACTION
Karen Sue Boxer*
I. INTRODUCTION
The first worldwide conference on the human environment
was held under United Nations auspices at Stockholm, Sweden,
from June 5 to 16, 1972, one hundred and fourteen countries
participating.' That Conference became the first articulation of
an international commitment to solve, through cooperative effort,
the frightening environmental problems which blight the present
and threaten the very existence of a future. With the spotlight at
last turned upon the environment, perhaps the most revealing
fact to be kept in mind about current "international environmen-
tal law" is that, barely nine years ago, no such separate discipline
was formally recognized.2 Against this backdrop, the accomplish-
ments of Stockholm, culminating in the drafting of the "Declara-
tion on the Human Environment,"3 are truly impressive.
Significant as the work of the Stockholm Conference is, how-
ever, its solutions to environmental problems are fundamentally
political ones, resting on the voluntary cooperation of participat-
* Law Clerk to the Honorable Paul R. Hays, Judge, United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit. B.A., University of Miami, 1961; M.A., Columbia University, 1963;
J.D., Columbia University School of Law, 1974. The author wishes to thank Richard N.
Gardner, Henry L. Moses Professor of Law and International Organization, Columbia
University School of Law, for suggesting the topic of this article and for his helpful
comments and warm encouragement during its development.
1. The Stockholm Conference had been six years in gestation. See note 2 infra. For a
complete account of the Conference, see Sohn, The Stockholm Declaration on the Human
Environment, 14 HARv. INT'L L.J. 423 (1973).
2. The topic of "problems of the human environment" was first explicitly debated
in the United Nations General Assembly in the mid 1960's. In December, 1968, the Swed-
ish proposal for an international conference, 45 U.N. ECOSOC, Annexes, Agenda Item
12 (Doc. E/4466/Add.I) at 2 (1968), was endorsed by the Economic and Social Council and
approved by the General Assembly of the United Nations, ECOSOC Res. 1346, July 30,
1968, 45 U.N. ECOSOC, Supp. 1, (Doc. E/4561) at 8 (1968); G.A. Res. 2398, Dec. 3, 1968,
23 U.N. GAOR, Supp. 18 (Doc. A/7218) at 2 (1969).
3. REPORT OF THE U.N. CONFERENCE ON THE HUMAN ENVIRONMENT, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.48/14 at 2-65, and Corr. 1 (1972), 11 INT'L LEG. MAT'S 1416-69 (1972). Of the 109
recommendations approved by the Conference, the most important relate to the establish-
ment of institutional and financial arrangements for a United Nations environmental
program and the institution of "Earthwatch", a global system for monitoring and evaluat-
ing environmental problems. See 11 INT'L LEG. MAT's at 1464.
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ing states working together on a policy-making level. Such co-
operation, always difficult, is particularly hard to achieve in the
environmental area. The developed, industrialized nations
which have built sophisticated and capital-rich economies,
often at the expense of localized and transnational environmen-
tal conditions, are belatedly realizing the large and often exces-
sive price they have paid for their industrial bases and, in varying
degree, favor action aimed at preventing further environmental
deterioration. The underdeveloped nations, by contrast, are
still faced with the prospect of a long and arduous climb out of
poverty, with the need to realize whatever advantages may be
attained from the natural resources they possess in order both to
increase their economic base and to better the living conditions
of their citizens. Despite an awareness of the ecological price
already paid by their more highly developed neighbors, they may,
nonetheless, be willing to pay the same price themselves to attain
a comparable level of development. The poorer nations argue,
with some force, that since most of the world's pollution and
ecological deterioration can be traced to the past policies of those
now most insistently seeking reform, equity requires that partial
exemption from the full impact of environmental strictures be
granted to the industrial latecomers until such time as they have
improved their economic position.4
4. The position of the underdeveloped nations does not, generally speaking, reflect
an unwillingness to comply with international demands for conformity to more rigid
standards of environmental care, but rather an insistence on a system of subsidies to
prevent their compliance from retarding their economic development. They favor the
principle of "additionality," whereby a "developed nation would be held liable for dam-
ages caused to a developing country as a result of its anti-pollution measures." Note, The
Stockholm Conference: A Step Toward Global Environmental Cooperation and
Involvement, 6 IND. L. REv. 267, 271 (1972). Thus, for example, the less developed coun-
tries demand compensatory agreements to guard against the restriction of their exports
caused by inability to comply with stricter environmental standards. Although some
industrialized nations have expressed support for the principle of additionality, others are
opposed, the major holdout against the concept being the United States. Id. at 271 n.15.
Consideration of the impact of the environmental movement on the developing na-
tions constituted the central debate at the Stockholm Conference itself. The delegates'
attempt to accommodate disparate views is embodied in Principle 23 of the Stockholm
Declaration which states that
[i]t will be essential in all cases to consider the systems of values prevailing in
each country; and the extent of the applicability of standards which are valid
for the most advanced countries but which may be inappropriate and of unwar-
ranted social cost for the developing countries.
REPORT OF THE U.N. CONFERENCE ON THE HuMAN ENVIRONMENT, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.48/14
(1972).
For the moment at least battle lines seem drawn over whether worldwide environmen-
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Cooperative global action becomes, therefore, increasingly
difficult to effectuate when the positions of the participants tend
to polarize along such lines of comparative development. Even
when international action is possible-and some cooperative en-
vironmental activities have in fact been undertaken on a regional
or bilateral basis by countries of similar economic develop-
ment'-such action is subject to the normal constraints of the
multinational lawmaking process.
Traditionally, only nation states have been considered the
subjects of international law with standing to present claims
against other sovereigns. Natural and corporate persons have gen-
erally been denied direct access to international tribunals to pres-
ent claims against foreign states or their citizens for personal
injury or property damages, or to protest the lack of fair and
effective local remedies.6 In the complex, often globally-oriented
interrelationships of states, the claim of a private plaintiff may
go unheard and the violative activity may be allowed to continue
because the offending party is not subject to the jurisdiction of
the municipal courts of the plaintiff's state. The injured party
whose cause is espoused by his government is fortunate; but a
mechanism must be developed to compensate the party whose
injury receives less sympathetic advocacy, or none at all, from his
government.
Even if a nation does agree to press the claim of its injured
national, international disputes can be judicially resolved only if
the involved nations will agree to the jurisdiction of either the
International Court of Justice or a comparable form of adjudica-
tion, such as arbitration.7 Moreover, claims may be accumulated
to be settled en masse, and any dispute-settlement process may
itself consume an extensive period of time, a period which has,
inevitably, a vastly different meaning to an injured individual
than it does to a nation state. Even after settlement is finally
made there is no assurance that the nation obtaining recovery on
behalf of its injured nationals, will actually distribute the pro-
tal improvement will be subsidized by the richer nations, and whether whatever environ-
mental standards are arrived at will be uniform.
5. See generally Bleicher, An Overview of International Environmental Regulation,
2 ECOL. L.Q. 1, 31-51 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Bleicher].
6. See generally F. DAwsON & I. HEAD, IzTERNATIONAL LAW, NATIONAL TRMUNALS, AND
THE PRIGHTS OF ALIENS (1971) [hereinafter cited as DAwsON & HE DI. See also 1 WHITEMAN,
DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW § 2 (1963).
7. See, e.g., Trail Smelter Arbitration (U.S. v. Canada), 3 U.N.R.I.A.A. 1905 (1941),
35 Am. J. INT'L L. 684 (1941).
[Vol. 1:1
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ceeds to them.' In addition, the dictates of political negotiation
may well operate to preclude the swift application of corrective
measures or other sanctions to prevent further injury. Compound-
ing these difficulties are those of agreeing on international stan-
dards and, often, of merely exchanging data such as damage and
treatment costs. Consequently, inaction becomes the rule and
effective measures tend to be limited to those which are instituted
to cope with catastrophe.9
In light, therefore, of, the difficulties attendant upon action
by international agreement or treaty, the possibility of utilizing
national systems to solve transnational environmental problems
should be carefully examined. Municipal systems may include
such measures as the imposition of product standards, the limita-
tion or prohibition of the manufacture of certain materials, uni-
lateral exclusion from intranational geographic jurisdiction of
ships, aircraft or products that do not conform to reasonable stan-
dards of construction or operation, and the extension of national
anti-pollution jurisdiction.'0 National systems often offer legally
enforceable standards of action in environmental areas and, per-
haps even more importantly, can be structured to provide a
means for compensating the victims of transnational injury.
It may initially appear paradoxical to propose an examina-
tion of national systems at a time when it has become increas-
ingly apparent that protection of our rapidly deteriorating envi-
ronment is an undertaking of global dimension, and that a solu-
tion correspondingly broad in scope is needed to deal with the
problem. This paradox is merely illusory, however; upon reflec-
tion it becomes clear that what is necessary is the development
and interaction of international organizations set up to examine,
utilize and increase awareness of effective unilateral environmen-
8. See L. HFNKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTIUTION 262-66 (1972). In the United
States, distribution of any recovery to injured nationals may be constitutionally required.
Id. Some countries have established national claims commissions to distribute any funds
recovered in international litigation. See generally R. LILCH, INTERNATIONAL CLAIMS:
THEIR ADJUDICATION By NATIONAL COMIMISSIONS 23-40 (1962). However, such awards gener-
ally are subject to only limited judicial review, if at all. See DAwsoN & HEAD at 53.
9. Bleicher notes that
[tlhe dangers of a slow, piecemeal approach is that it is likely to leave us, in
the words of a United States Government memorandum, one convention behind
the next major pollution disaster, not only because of the slow process of drafting
and signing a large number of conventions, but because of the inevitable delays
in ratification.
Bleicher at 50-51 (footnotes omitted).
10. See generally Serwer, International Cooperation for Pollution Control, LAW,
INsTrUTIONS, AND THE GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT 178-207 (J. Hargrove ed. 1972).
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tal remedies. Not only can such national remedies provide valu-
able insights for the development of a viable international system
of environmental protection, but they can provide workable mod-
els for individual nations which are in the process of developing
and improving their own domestic environmental law systems.
This recommended approach merely acknowledges the ines-
capable fact that national and international systems of law are
inextricably interwoven. International law depends for its very
existence upon achieving a consensus among national systems
which, once established, can in turn add new dimensions to na-
tional law. For example, as the consensus among nations on the
urgency of controlling environmental damage becomes more
widespread, culminating in environmental protection legislation,
the probability greatly increases that Principles 21 and 22 of the
Stockholm Conference, respectively, which, propose a duty to
refrain from transfrontier pollution and a duty to provide com-
pensation to victims of such pollution," will achieve the status of
rules of international law." Moreover, if these Principles are ele-
vated to the level of generally recognized rules of conduct, they
will, as international law, often be enforceable in municipal
courts. 3 Aside from actual incorporation of international law, a
sovereign's evaluation of the content and reach of its own domes-
tic law will be profoundly influenced by considerations of interna-
tional relations, as illustrated by recent efforts in the United
States to suspend temporarily some of the requirements of the
11. Principle 21 states that
States have, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the
principle of international law, the sovereign right to exploit their own resources
pursuant to their own environmental policies, and the responsibility to ensure
that activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the
environment of other states or of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.
Principle 22 declares that
States shall co-operate to develop further the international law regarding liabil-
ity and compensation for the victims of pollution and other environmental dam-
age caused by activities within the jurisdiction or control of such states to areas
beyond their jurisdiction.
Report, supra note 3, 11 INT'L LEG. MAT'S at 1420.
12. For examples of unilateral action leading to the development of international law,
see Bilder, The Canadian Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act: New Stresses on the
Law of the Sea, 69 MICH. L. Rv. 1, 25 (1970).
13. Nations adopt various methods to incorporate international law into their munic-
ipal systems; see, e.g., R. MASTERS, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN NATIONAL COURTS (1932). The
United States Supreme Court has recognized that international law must be ascertained
and administered by the courts whenever an adjudication depending upon it is presented.
See The Paquette Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900).
[Vol. 1:1
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Clean Air Act'4 in response to the energy crisis. 5
As the state of the environment becomes an increasingly vol-
atile issue on the national level, the number of domestic laws
dealing with environmental considerations is likely to increase
concomitantly. Such laws not only have transnational effects
now, but the unilateral actions of individual nations today may
become the consensual law of the world tomorrow. An examina-
tion of existing national environmental legislation is, therefore,
appropriate to understand the foundation upon which a more far-
reaching system for the protection both of injured plaintiffs, and
of the world's resources, could be based.
II. SELECTED ASPECTS OF AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
The very concept of transnational use of national systems for
dealing with environmental problems of course presupposes that
viable and effectively utilized national systems exist. Many na-
tional systems, those of developed as well as less developed coun-
tries, do not meet this standard."6 The American system exhibits
a wide variety of effective, and often unique, administrative and
judicial mechanisms for dealing with environmental problems. As
a result, the focus of this analysis will be upon selected aspects
of that system of environmental law.
The history of American environmental law is one of move-
ment from almost unrestricted private use of natural resources,
to governmental regulation of private use of such resources, to
citizen overview of governmental regulation of the use of re-
14. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1857 et seq. (1970), as amended, (Supp. II, 1972).
15. Council On Environmental Quality, ANNUAL REPORT 551-563 (1974), reprinting
The President's Message to Congress of January 23, 1974. See also Comment,
Environmental Legislation Passed By the 93rd Congress: A Review, 5 E.L.R. 10020, 10022
(1975).
Another example is the Canadian Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act, 18-19 Eliz.
2, c. 47 (Can. 1970). The Act claims Canadian jurisdiction over two hundred miles of
coastal waters for purposes of environmental protection and was passed primarily in
response to "an increasing and profound disillusionment and frustration with interna-
tional processes concerning the law of the sea. . . ." Bilder, supra note 12, at 23. While
economic motivations were also present, there seems little doubt of Canada's good faith
in asserting that her principal concern was with the environment. As one commentator
has noted, "[wihen states such as Canada perceive collective international processes as
unlikely in practice to protect what they regard as vital interests, they may see no viable
alternative to unilateral action, whatever the consequences such action may produce for
the existing legal system." Id. at 26-27.
16. See Council on Environmental Quality, ANNUAL REPORT 350-55 (1973). See also
Juergensmeyer, A Comparative View of the Legal Aspects of Pollution Control, 5 SuFFOLK
L. REv. 741 (1971).
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sources.' 7 It is this last step which is unique. Many other nations
permit private damage actions for those injured by the activities
of polluters," and most industrialized nations have some form of
governmental regulation of environment-affecting activities.'"
These schemes often provide for some citizen involvement at
administrative hearings. Nowhere, however, is there legislation
comparable to the National Environmental Policy Act,20 which
enables private citizens to force reluctant agencies to consider in-
depth environmental factors in planning federal projects.21 Simi-
larly, citizen suit provisions of the Clean Air Act22 and Federal
Water Pollution Control Act Amendments, 3 which specifically
confer upon citizens a right to challenge in the courts ineffective
governmental enforcement of statutory requirements, are a
uniquely American invention.
Before examining the extent to which the American environ-
mental law system can be utilized to adjudicate transnational
disputes, some general observations on the remedies available
under that system are necessary.
The American environmental law system, like virtually all
environmental law systems, has two goals: financial compensa-
tion to injured individuals and, in a broader context, protection
of natural resources. Traditional environmental litigation, consis-
ting primarily of actions brought on various common law theories
seeking damages or injunctive relief, has been relatively success-
ful, at least in the domestic context, in achieving the first of these
goals.24 It has been less effective when the relief required goes
17. Wengert, Notes on the Development of Environmental Law in the United States,
(based on the author's contribution to ENVIRONMENTAL DESIGN AND PUBLIC PROJECTS (D.
Hendricks, E. Vlaches, L. Tucker & J. Kellogg eds. 1973)).
18. For example, in the countries of the British Commonwealth, pollution claims are
generally litigated on the basis of common law theories of recovery, most notably on the
theory of nuisance. See generally, Juergensmeyer, supra note 16, at 741. By contrast, in
civil law countries, including the members of the European Economic Community, very
little "private judicial activity" by individuals is encountered. Id. at 777.
19. For a collection of papers describing some of these mechanisms, see Economic
Commission for Europe, Symposium on Problems Relating to the Environment Proc. and
Documentation, May 3-10, 1971, Prague, Czechoslovakia. U.N.P. Sales No. E. 71. II. E.
6. United Nations Publication ST/ECE/ENV/1.
20. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321 et seq. (1970), as amended, (Supp. II, 1972). But see text
accompanying note 89 infra.
21. See, e.g., Maryland-National Capital Park & Planning Comm. v. Postal Serv.,
487 F.2d 1029 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Save Our Ten Acres v. Kreger, 472 F.2d 463 (5th Cir. 1973);
Hanly v. Kleindienst, 471 F.2d 823 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 908 (1973);
Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
22. 42 U.S.C. § 1857h-2 (1970).
23. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251 et seq. (Supp. I, 1972).
24. See, e.g., Martin v. Reynolds Metal Co., 221 Ore. 86, 342 P.2d 790 (1959), cert.
[Vol. 1: 1
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beyond the payment of money damages. 25 Recently enacted fed-
eral statutory provisions are designed to fill this gap by providing
mechanisms for compelling governmental consideration and en-
forcement of environmental quality standards. While common
law damage remedies continue to be utilized, this recent federal
legislation has provided the greatest advances for environmen-
talists in the United States.
By far the most significant piece of environmental legislation
in the United States is the National Environmental Policy Act of
1969 [hereinafter referred to as NEPA].25 NEPA enunciates a
national policy of environmental protections and imposes on all
federal agencies an obligation to "identify and develop methods
and procedures . . . which will insure that presently unquanti-
fled environmental amenities and values may be given appropri-
ate consideration in decision-making. . . ."2 Each federal
agency must file a detailed statement of the environmental im-
pact of all major federal actions which may significantly affect
the quality of the environment;29 other government agencies and
denied, 362 U.S. 918 (1960) (trespass); Jost v. Dairyland Power Cooperative, 45 Wis. 2d
164, 172 N.W.2d 647 (1970) (nuisance). See generally 1 F. GRAD, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
(1971); 2 F. GRAD, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (1972).
25. See, e.g., Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 26 N.Y.2d 219, 257 N.E.2d 870, 309
N.Y.S.2d 312 (1970).
26. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321 et seq. (1970), as amended, (Supp. II, 1972). For excellent
discussions of NEPA, see Council on Environmental Quality, ANNUAL REPORT 371-420
(1974); Yarrington, The National Environmental Policy Act, 4 BNA ENVm. REP. (Mono-
graph No. 17) 1 (1974).
27. 42 U.S.C. § 4331 (1970).
28. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(B) (1970).
29. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1970) provides that all agencies of the federal government
shall:
include in every recommendation or report on proposals for legislation and
other major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human
environment, a detailed statement by the responsible official on-
(i) the environmental impact of the proposed action,
(ii) any adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided
should the proposal be implemented,
(iii) alternatives to the proposed action,
(iv) the relationship between local short-term uses of man's envi-
ronment and the maintenance and enhancement of long-term productiv-
ity, and
(v) any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources
which would be involved in the proposed action should it be imple-
mented.
The threshold determination of whether the filing of an impact statement is required is
made by the agency having primary responsibility for the proposed federal action. S. REP.
No. 296, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 20 (1969). Although the courts have agreed that this determi-
nation is subject to judicial review, they have differed on the appropriate standard to be
applied. Compare Save Our Ten Acres v. Kreger, 472 F.2d 463, 465 (5th Cir. 1973)
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the public must be given the opportunity to scrutinize and com-
ment on these impact statements before ultimate decisions are
made. 0 Thus, despite the fact that the requirements which
NEPA imposes are procedural rather than substantive, it is
"action-forcing, ' 31 and an agency which does not comply with its
statutory duties under NEPA is subject to suit.3" On the other
hand, if the agency has complied with these procedural require-
ments and decides to proceed despite an adverse environmental
impact, the court, once convinced that the agency has indeed
considered all appropriate environmental factors,33 has no power
to substitute its judgment on the merits for that of the agency.
Perhaps the primary significance of NEPA lies in the fact
that, in contrast to most environmental legislation which focuses
on standard setting and remedial action available in the event of
noncompliance with said standards, NEPA provides a viable
(agency's threshold determination not to file an environmental impact statement should
be reviewed under the standard of reasonableness rather than by the narrower standard
or arbitrariness or capriciousness) with Hanly v. Kleindienst, 471 F.2d 823, 829 (2d Cir.
1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 908 (1973) (the appropriate standard for review is the "arbi-
trary, capricious" standard rather than the "rational basis" standard). See generally
Note, NEPA, Environmental Impact Statements and the Hanly Litigation: To File or Not
To File, 48 N.Y.U.L. REv. 522 (1973).
30. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1970).
31. The Senate Report on NEPA labelled section 102 as "action-forcing." S. REP. No.
296, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 19 (1969). Supporters of the bill insisted that such a mechanism
was necessary to insure governmental compliance with NEPA's policy mandate. See, e.g.,
Hearings on S. 1075, S. 237 and S. 1752 Before the Senate Comm. on Interior and Insular
Affairs, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 116 (1969).
32. On review, the court will consider whether the agency was required to prepare an
impact statement, see note 29 supra, whether the statement was prepared in the proper
manner, see, e.g., Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. AEC, 449 F.2d at 1109, and
whether the statement is sufficiently broad in the scope of its contents, see, e.g., Hanly
v. Kleindienst, 471 F.2d 823 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 908 (1973).
33. An agency's obligation under NEPA is an affirmative one; throughout the NEPA
process, the agency must take positive steps to ascertain the effect of its actions on the
environment.
[The agency's] responsibility is not simply to sit back, like an umpire, and
resolve adversary contentions at the hearing stage. Rather, it must itself take
the initiative of considering environmental values at every distinctive and com-
prehensive stage of the process ...
Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. AEC, 449 F.2d at 1119. See also Hanly v.
Kleindienst, 471 F.2d 823 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 908 (1973). Cf. Scenic
Hudson Preservation Conf. v. FPC, 354 F.2d 608, 620 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S.
941 (1966) (decided under the Federal Power Act and holding that an agency which
represents the public interest must act affirmatively to protect the rights of the public).
34. Save Our Ten Acres v. Kreger, 472 F.2d 463, 467 (5th Cir. 1973). But see Calvert
Cliffs' Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. AEC, 449 F.2d at 1115 (suggesting that reversal on
the merits may be possible if the agency's decision is clearly arbitrary or clearly gave
insufficient weight to environmental values).
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mechanism for permitting anticipatory relief. Courts have recog-
nized that "[i]t is far more consistent with the purposes of
[NEPA] to delay operation at a stage where real environmental
protection may come about than at a stage where corrective ac-
tion may be so costly as to be impossible." 35 Accordingly, courts
have enjoined even environmentally neutral preliminary seg-
ments of environmentally significant projects pending formula-
tion and approval of an environmental impact statement. 36 It is
this anticipatory mechanism, in conjunction with liberalized con-
cepts of standing, 7 the rise of committed environmental interest
groups, and broad interpretations by the courts of the Act's re-
quirement, which have molded NEPA into an extremely valuable
environmentalists' tool.
As valuable as NEPA has shown itself to be, its efficacy lies
in its potential for forcing those who make basic policy decisions
to take environmental factors into account. It is a procedural
management tool and as such is not a substitute for sound sub-
stantive legislation to regulate specific areas of environmental
concern. Such statutes abound in the United States at all levels
of governmental organization. 8 Of particular importance are the
Clean Air Act Amendments of 197039 and the Federal Water Pol-
lution Control Amendments of 1972.10 In addition to complex
provisions for functionally integrating state and federal systems, 41
35. Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. AEC, 449 F.2d at 1128.
36. People of Enewetak v. Laird, 353 F. Supp. 811, 820-21 (D. Haw. 1973).
37. See note 56 infra.
38. See generally 1 F. GRAD, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (1973).
39. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1857 et seq. (1970), as amended, (Supp. II, 1972). See generally
Settle, Guarding the Guardian: The "Citizen Suit" for Clean Air, 3 ENVIR. LAw 1 (1973).
40. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251 et seq. (Supp. I, 1972). See generally Comment, The Federal
Water Pollution Controls Act Amendments of 1972, 14 B.C. IND. & CoM. L. REv. 672
(1973).
41. The general statutory framework for these laws involves total federal preemption
of some areas (e.g., emission controls for new motor vehicles and aircraft emission stan-
dards under the Clean Air Act); partial federal preenption of others (new source perform-
ance standards and hazardous emission standards or toxic effluent standards under both
the Clean Air Act and the Federal Water Pollution Control Act); and an area where states
may adopt and enforce emission and effluent standards so long as they comply with
minimum federal standards of air or water quality. See Luneberg, Federal-State Interac-
tion Under the Clear Air Amendments of 1970, 14 B.C. IND. & CoM. L. Rv. 637 (1973).
The Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency determines the minimum
acceptable national standards, and promulgates guidelines for state standards in this
third area. Each state must then, within a specified time period, hold public hearings,
adopt and submit to the EPA a state implementation plan which at least meets federal
standards, though a state retains the right to set more stringent standards. The EPA
Administrator must then, within a specified time period, adopt or reject the state plan.
33 U.S.C. §§ 1311-14 (Supp. II, 1972). If the state submits no plan or fails to revise a plan
1975]
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these Acts are unique in that they authorize citizens both to
institute lawsuits against polluters to compel compliance,42 and
to sue the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency
if he fails to carry out a nondiscretionary duty.4 3
Citizen suits are contingent upon sixty days prior notice to
the Administrator, the proper state agency, and the alleged viola-
tor.44 If, at the end of this time, an abatement action is pending
and is being diligently pursued in a district or state court, a
citizen suit cannot be commenced; however, any party in interest
may intervene in that action as a matter of right. 5 Although both
the Clean Air Act and the Federal Water Pollution Control
Amendments specifically reserve any rights and remedies under
which has been rejected, the Administrator of the EPA is required to promulgate an
acceptable plan for that state. 33 U.S.C. § 1313(b) (Supp. II, 1972). Once the plan for the
state is promulgated or accepted, it becomes "federalized"; thus, although the states are
expected to assume the primary responsibility of enforcement, the federal government
retains the right to assume enforcement if any state is derelict in that duty. 33 U.S.C. §
1319 (Supp. II, 1972).
Under the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments, the primary means of
enforcement is via a nationwide permit system. 33 U.S.C. § 1341 (Supp. 1H, 1972). A
permit is required for anyone discharging effluents into navigable waters. States must hold
public hearings for review and revision of water quality standards at least every three years
and each such revision is subject to the approval of the Administrator of the EPA. 33
U.S.C. § 1313(c) (Supp. II, 1972). Similar opportunities for revision of standards are
available under the Clean Air Act. 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-2(d) (1970).
42. Section 304 of the Clean Air Act of 1970, 42 U.S.C. § 1857h-2(a) (1970), and
section 505 of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (Supp. II, 1972),
provide that suit may be filed by "any person" or "any citizen" against private polluters
or government agencies for failure to comply with emission or effluent limitations, state
implementation plans, or abatement orders issued by the Environmental Protection
Agency or a state agency. See Council on Environmental Quality, ANNUAL REPORT 176-77
(1972).
The Federal Water Pollution Control Act differs from the Clean Air Act in that it
provides for the imposition of civil penalties of up to $10,000 a day in addition to injunctive
relief; it also permits a state governor to disregard the notice provision, see note 41 supra,
in a suit against a private polluter where a violation in another state "is causing an
adverse effect on the public health and welfare in his State, or is causing a violation of
any water quality requirement in his State." Mannino, Citizen Suits to Protect the Envi-
ronment, An Introduction to Some "New Remedies," 44 PA. B.A.Q. 181, 188 (1973).
43. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a)(2) (Supp. II, 1972); 42 U.S.C. § 1857h-2(a) (1970).
44. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b) (Supp. II, 1972); 42 U.S.C. § 1857h-2(b) (1970). The notice
provisions are not operative in the case of violations of hazardous emission or toxic effluent
standards, for violations of new source standards, and for violations of abatement orders.
The theory behind the notice provisions is that the Administrator, having been notified,
will take action to have the violation corrected and thereby relieve the citizen from the
burden of maintaining the suit.
45. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b)(1)(B) (Supp. II, 1972); 42 U.S.C. § 1857h-2(b)(1)(B) (1970).
The Administrator may intervene in any citizen action to which he is not a party. 33
U.S.C. § 1365(c)(2) (Supp. I, 1972); 42 U.S.C. 1857h-2(c)(2) (1970).
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any other law, citizen suits are for enforcement only," and the
joinder of damage actions is not permitted unless there is an
independent basis for federal jurisdiction.47
The Clean Air Act Amendments and the Federal Water Pol-
lution Control Act Amendments illustrate a scheme of regulation
designed to adjust pollution control responsibilities between fed-
eral and state sovereignties, while providing for maximum feasi-
ble participation of individual citizens in the regulation process.
The litigation provisions, being limited to correction of violations,
lack the anticipatory mechanism found in NEPA. Like NEPA,
however, they are action-forcing8 because they impose specific
legislative deadlines upon statutorily required actions49 and pro-
vide judicial remedies in the event of noncompliance."
In addition to the laws which have been discussed, there is a
wide variety of innovative environmental control mechanisms
extant in the United States, the proliferation attributable in part
to the complexities of the federal system.51 There is also a move-
ment in the United States to have "freedom from environmental
harm" elevated to the stature of a constitutionally protected
right.52 Furthermore, the Supreme Court has recently opened the
46. The district courts may order compliance and, in addition, may award court costs
(including reasonable attorney and expert witness fees) at its discretion to either party to
the action. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(d) (Supp. II, 1972); 42 U.S.C. § 1857h-2(d) (1970).
The entire area of counsel fees in citizen suits may soon be clarified by the Supreme
Court, which has recently granted certiorari in Wilderness Society v. Morton, 495 F.2d
1026 (D.C. Cir. 1974), cert. granted sub nom., Alyeska Pipeline Ser. Co. v. Wilderness
Society, 43 U.S.L.W. 3208 (U.S. Dec. 15, 1974), to consider the appropriateness of a
grant of counsel fees to citizen groups bringing suit under NEPA. Oral argument was
heard January 22, 1975. 43 U.S.L.W. 3414 (U.S. Jan. 28, 1975).
47. If an alien is party to the suit, a damage action could be joined if the amount in
controversy is over $10,000 since a suit between a United States citizen and an alien falls
within the federal diversity jurisdiction provision, see text accompanying note 64 supra.
48. See note 31 supra.
49. See note 41 supra.
50. See text accompanying notes 42-43 supra.
51. Vermont, for example, has enacted legislation which embodies the principle of
the effluent charge. 10 VT. STAT. ANN. §§ 910 et seq. (1970). See generally 1 F. GRAD,
ENVIRONMETAL LAW § 2.03 [4] (1973). Michigan has enacted a statute grounded in the
ancient common law doctrine of the "public trust." It gives standing to virtually anyone
to assert environmental rights and permits the courts to perform the legislative function
of adopting environmental standards. MICH. CoMP. L. ANN. §§ 691.1201 et seq. (Supp.
1974). See generally J. SAX, DEFENDING THE ENviRONMENT: A STRATEGY FOR CITIZEN ACTION
(1971); Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial
Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REv. 471 (1970). Furthermore, many areas have enacted local
legislation patterned after the federal statutes. See Luneberg, supra note 41.
52. See, e.g., Klipsch, Aspects of a Constitutional Right to a Habitable Environment:
Towards An Environmental Due Process, 49 IND. L.J. 203 (1974).
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way for the development of a federal common law of nuisance. 3
Any or all of these approaches, as well as the legal and institu-
tional mechanisms utilized in functionally integrating such a va-
riety of approaches, will have important implications for action
aimed at protecting the international environment.
While it is possible to outline briefly the remedies by means
of which the American system of environmental law achieves its
goals in the domestic context, there are a number of key threshold
issues which must be examined in order to evaluate the adapta-
bility of that system to situations which are not wholly domestic
in nature. Perhaps the single most significant issue in determin-
ing the extent to which a domestic legal system can be utilized
to adjudicate transnational disputes is the status which that sys-
tem accords the alien plaintiff. Most federal and state courts in
the United States have adopted the position that resident and
nonresident friendly aliens have the same legal capacity to sue
and be sued as do citizens of the jurisdiction. 4 Thus, if an alien
plaintiff has a legally cognizable claim under the common law or
an applicable statute, he will not be barred from asserting it in
an American forum merely because he is an alien.
In order to assert his claim, however, an alien plaintiff, like
a domestic plaintiff, must meet the general test of standing. 5 The
Supreme Court has set forth the guiding principles for determin-
ing the question of standing to sue:
Where the party does not rely on any specific statute authoriz-
ing invocation of the judicial process, the question of standing
depends upon whether the party has alleged such a "personal
stake in the outcome of the controversy" . . . as to ensure that
"the dispute sought to be adjudicated will be presented in an
adversary context and in a form historically viewed as capable
53. Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91 (1972). The Court held that the district
court had jurisdiction to hear a pollution abatement suit brought by the State of Illinois
against a political subdivision of another state under 28 U.S.C. section 1331(a) (1970), the
general federal question provision, even though the action did not arise under a specific
statute of the United States. While this case arguably provides a basis for the development
of a federal common law of nuisance, the extent to which its reasoning is applicable to
suits between private parties is not yet settled. See Campbell, Illinois v. City of Milwau-
kee: Federal Question Jurisdiction Through Federal Common Law, 3 ENVIR. LAw 267
(1973).
54. The Judiciary Act of 1789 specifically granted aliens access to federal courts. Act
of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, 11, 1 Stat. 78; see Ex Parte Kawato, 317 U.S. 69, 77 n.13 (1942);
Dunlop & Co. v. Ball, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 180 (1804). See also Taylor v. Carpenter, 11 Paige
292 (N.Y. Ch. 1844).
55. On standing to sue, see generally C. WRioHT, LAW OF FNDERAL COURTS § 13 (2d
ed. 1970).
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of judicial resolution." . . . Where, however, Congress has au-
thorized public officials to perform certain functions according
to law, and has provided by statute for judicial review of those
actions under certain circumstances, the inquiry as to standing
must begin with a determination of whether the statute in ques-
tion authorizes review at the behest of the plaintiff."
An alien plaintiff may, therefore, be initially confronted with the
argument that the right conferred by the statute upon which suit
is based was intended to be limited to citizens.57
The question of the extent to which foreign citizens may
participate in the NEPA process was apparently resolved in
Wilderness Society v. Morton." There, environmental groups
challenged the construction of the Trans-Alaskan Pipeline, on the
grounds, inter alia, that the Secretary of the Interior did not
comply with NEPA's impact statement requirement. The Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit allowed Canadian
56. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 732 (1971) (citations omitted). Standing to
bring statutory actions to challenge administrative decisions in court is governed by the
language of the particular statute or by the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§
701 et seq. (1970). To contest the legality of an administrative action of the federal
government, as is necessarily the case when a statute such as NEPA is invoked, the
Administrative Procedure Act requires that the person or group bringing the suit be
"aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute." 5 U.S.C. § 702
(1970). In interpreting this provision, the Supreme Court has adopted a two-pronged test
of standing which requires plaintiff to allege first, that the challenged action has caused
him "injury in fact," economic or other, and second that the interest sought to be pro-
tected is "arguably within the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the statute"
in question. Association of Data Processing Ser. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 152-
53 (1970); Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159, 164 (1970). In Sierra Club v. Morton the
Supreme Court clearly established that environmental injuries were of sufficient stature
to establish standing, but held that the complainant must show that he himself is among
those harmed. 405 U.S. at 734-35. Once standing has been established, however, the
litigant may assert the general public interest in protecting the threatened environmental
asset. Id. at 737.
57. Although early Supreme Court cases permitted statutes to discriminate on the
basis of alienage, provided that the state could demonstrate a rational basis for doing so,
Terrance v. Thompson, 263 U.S. 197, 217-18 (1923) (land-holding); Patsone v. Pennsyl-
vania, 232 U.S. 138, 143-44 (1914) (killing of wild game), more recent decisions of the
Court have held alienage to be a suspect classification requiring a compelling state interest
to justify discrimination against resident aliens, In re Griffiths. 413 U.S. 717, 721 (1973)
(eligibility to take a state bar examination); Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 642
(1973) (competitive civil service appointments); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372
(1971) (welfare benefits).
58. 463 F.2d 1261 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
59. This issue was eventually resolved by action of Congress. See Wilderness Society
v. Morton, 495 F.2d at 1033-35. The Supreme Court has granted certiorari to consider
whether an award of legal costs to plaintiff was proper under these circumstances; see note
46 supra.
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citizens to intervene in order to raise issues regarding the impact
of the project on territory under Canadian jurisdiction. The stan-
dard employed in deciding whether or not to permit intervention
was apparently the same as that which would have been applied
in a purely domestic context, i.e., whether or not the intervenors'
interests were sufficiently antagonistic to those of parties before
the court to justify permitting the intervenor to represent his own
interests in the judicial process. The court specifically rejected
the appellee's claim that challenges under NEPA, when made by
non-United States citizens, are non-justiciable. "
The Wilderness Society holding was subsequently inter-
preted in People of Enewetak v. Laird"1 in which the court held
that the Enewetakese, whose ancestral home was part of a United
States Trust Territory, had standing to bring a NEPA action. The
court specifically commented that
[t]he fact that the Enewetakese are non-resident aliens does
not detract from their standing to sue . . .While it is true that
non-resident aliens are denied standing in situations where the
statute involved evinces such an intent-as in immigration dis-
putes. . . -no such intent is apparent in NEPA 2
The analogous question of whether nonresident aliens may bring
citizen suits under the Clean Air Act and the Federal Water Pol-
lution Control Act provisions has not yet been litigated. 3
In addition to the necessity of a proper plaintiff, an American
court cannot adjudicate a dispute unless the requirements of sub-
ject matter and personal jurisdiction are satisfied. The United
States Judicial Code provides that federal courts have diversity
60. The court noted that the Canadians were participating in the related administra-
tive proceedings and concluded that "[n]o reason appears why they should not be al-
lowed to participate with the other parties in the judicial review of those proceedings."
463 F.2d at 1262 n.2.
61. 353 F. Supp. 811 (D. Haw. 1973).
62. Id. at 820 n.14. See also People of Saipan v. Department of Interior, 502 F.2d 90
(9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 43 U.S.L.W. 3525 (U.S. March 31, 1975); note 77 infra.
63. Almost all citizen suit litigation pursued in the federal courts to date has focused
on challenges to administrative action taken with respect to the implementation plan
program under the Clean Air Act; see Comment, The Aftermath of the Clean Air Amend-
ments of 1970: The Federal Courts and Air Pollution, 14 B.C. IND. & Com. L.R. 724 (1973).
However, aliens do not appear to be precluded from bringing actions under the Clean Air
Act since the statute itself provides that "any person" may sue, 42 U.S.C. § 1857h-2
(1970). And while the Federal Water Pollution Control Act language is more restrictive,
limiting suit to "any citizen," the statute itself defines "citizen" very broadly as "a person
or persons having an interest which is or may be adversely affected." 33 U.S.C. § 1365(g)
(Supp. II, 1972).
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jurisdiction in an action between an alien and a United States
citizen. 4 Despite this provision, some ambiguity remains with
respect to jurisdiction over transnational pollution cases because,
in diversity actions, state rather than federal law usually gov-
erns.65 The extent to which this fact creates obstacles to successful
private litigation for damages or injunctive relief from injurious
activities occurring across national boundaries varies from state
to state. For example, some state courts are not permitted to
exercise jurisdiction over injuries to property located outside the
64. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (1970) provides:
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions where the
matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $10,000, exclusive of interest
and costs, and is between-
(1) citizens of different States;
(2) citizens of a State, and foreign states or citizens or subjects thereof;
and
(3) citizens of different States and in which foreign states or citizens or
subjects thereof are additional parties.
In addition, federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction over actions brought by an alien "for
a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States."
28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1970). This provision, which deprives state courts of jurisdiction in such
cases, has been strictly construed; see O'Reilly de Camara v. Brooke, 209 U.S. 45 (1908);
Khedirial Line, S.A.E. v. Seafarers' Int'l Union, 278 F.2d 49 (2d Cir. 1960). Although the
Judicial Code gives the Supreme Court original (but not exclusive) jurisdiction of any
action brought by a state against an alien, no such cases have been reported. DAwsON &
HEAD, supra note 6, at 128.
65. As one commentator noted:
The extent of the ambiguity surrounding such transnational litigation became
apparent when some Canadian citizens inquired about the scope of their rights
under a treaty provision reading:
[A]ny interference with or diversion from their natural channel of such
waters on either side of the boundary, resulting in any injury on the other
side of the boundary, shall give rise to the same rights and entitle the
injured parties to the same legal remedies as if such injury took place in
the country where such diversion or interference occurs ...
Treaty with Great Britain Relating to Boundary Waters between the United
States and Canada, Jan. 11, 1909, art. II, 36 Stat. 2448 (1910), T.S. No. 548
(effective May 5, 1910). . . . The United States Government responded:
I regret that this Government cannot undertake to answer your inquiry
as to what are the rights and remedies of the citizens of Minnesota in
respect to such a case as the one under consideration, for that is a ques-
tion which depends to a great extent upon State law rather than Federal
law, and falls outside of the jurisdiction of this Department, except in so
far as the treaty requires that Canadian interests in the State of Minne-
sota be protected, and on this point the provisions of the treaty are
regarded as sufficient in themselves to insure such treatment.
Speech by Acting Sec'y of State, Aug. 22, 1911, as cited in Griffin, A History of
the Canadian-United States Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909, 37 U. DEw. L.J.
76, 94 (1959). No cases have been brought in the United States under this
provision of the treaty.
Bleicher, supra note 5, at 15 n.45.
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state.6 On the other hand, the vast extension of personal jurisdic-
tion via state "long arm" statutes may make it easier for residents
to bring transnational suits against foreign polluters doing busi-
ness or maintaining other contacts within the state."
When suit is brought under a federal statute, the analogous
question arises as to whether the statute should be interpreted to
permit American courts to exercise jurisdiction in cases where the
acts giving rise to suit occurred outside the geographic confines
of the United States.68 When such acts have repercussions in the
United States, there is a sufficient basis for entertaining such a
suit; 9 furthermore, allowing residents to bring, for example, citi-
zen suits under the Clean Air Act and Federal Water Pollution
Control Act Amendments against extraterritorial polluters whose
activities result in substandard quality levels within the United
States would appear to be, at least in some cases, necessary to
effectuate the statutory purpose. However, the question of the
extraterritorial application of these statutes apparently has not
yet been litigated.
Under NEPA, where the party against whom suit is brought
is necessarily a federal governmental agency or administrator
thereof, the issue of extraterritorial application of the statute has
arisen in the form of a controversy as to the extent to which the
66. Arvidson v. Reynolds Metals Co., 107 F. Supp. 51 (D. Wash. 1952). See The Trail
Smelter Dispute, 1 CAN. Y.B. INT'L L. 213, 222-23 (1963), citing British So. Africa Co. v.
Companhia de Mocambique, [1893] A.C. 602.
67. Bleicher, supra note 5, at 15 n.45. For a discussion focusing particularly on the
New York long arm statute, see DAWSON & HEAD at 170-71.
68. American courts view the question as one grounded upon statutory construction.
The courts examine the history and purposes of the legislation to ascertain the congres-
sional intent as to its extraterritorial application; see, e.g., McCullogh v. Sociedad Na-
cional De Marineros De Honduras, 372 U.S. 10 (1963); Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344
U.S. 280 (1952). If such an intent is discerned, the courts have gone on to determine
whether a sufficient jurisdictional basis exists in the matter under consideration, for
application of the statute; see, e.g., United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d
416 (2d Cir. 1945); Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 268 F. Supp. 385 (S.D.N.Y. 1967). Addi-
tionally, the possible effects which applying the statute might have upon international
relations are examined by the courts; see, e.g., Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide &
Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690 (1962).
69. See United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d at 416.
70. See note 63 supra. Although the penalty provisions of the Federal Water Pollution
Control Act speak broadly of "any person" in violation, the Act continues the "Conference
Procedure" available under prior law for purposes of international pollution abatement.
33 U.S.C. § 1320 (Supp. II, 1972). The conference procedure is available only to a foreign
country which gives similar rights to the United States, and all other functions of the
Administrator under the Act are unaffected. A similar conference procedure is available
under the Clean Air Act. 42 U.S.C. § 1857(d) (1970), as amended, (Supp. II, 1972).
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Act applies to those federal agencies whose activities have their
sole or primary impact abroad.71
Section 102(2)(E)7 2 is the only section of NEPA which is di-
rected primarily to the international environment. This provision
requires all agencies to
[r]ecognize the world-wide and long-range character of envi-
ronmental problems and, where consistent with the foreign pol-
icy of the United States, lend appropriate support to initiatives,
resolutions, and programs designed to maximize international
cooperation in anticipating and preventing a decline in the qual-
ity of mankind's world environment.3
While some agencies whose activities are primarily international
in character and effect have promulgated regulations requiring
the preparation of environmental impact statements,74 others
have taken the view that a general policy commitment to environ-
mental protection is the extent of their obligation under NEPA
and that NEPA's specific procedural requirements either do not
apply 5 or are attenuated as to them.76 The evident uncertainty
over the foreign reach of NEPA has arisen because neither
NEPA's language nor its legislative history is explicit about the
71. See Frank, The Foreign Reach of NEPA, AL-ABA COURSE OF STUDY: INTERNA-
TIONAL AND TRADE ASPECTS OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 131 (1974) [hereinafter cited as
Frank]. See also Council on Environmental Quality, ANNUAL REPoRT 381-86 (1974).
72. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(E) (1970).
73. Id.
74. Although the Department of State initially contended that impact in foreign
jurisdictions is not covered by NEPA, it has since promulgated regulations requiring the
preparation of impact statements for its actions, which include international activities
significantly affecting the environment, 37 Fed. Reg. 19167-9 (1972). The Department of
Defense has also promulgated regulations calling for the filing of impact statements. 39
Fed. Reg. 14699 (1974).
75. The Export-Import Bank (Eximbank), despite the unquestioned environmental
significance of its program, has no environmental regulations, does not prepare environ-
mental impact statements and maintains that NEPA has no extraterritorial effect and
therefore does not apply to Eximbank's activities which, in the agency's view, have no
adverse environmental effect in the United States. FRANK at 144. The President of Exim-
bank has, however, in a memorandum to the staff, requested loan officers to evaluate the
environmental impact of Eximbank activities; Memorandum (January 1, 1971), reprinted
in FRANK, Appendix E.
76. The Agency for International Development (AID) has disseminated a circular
informing its foreign officers of the "need of assessing the environmental costs of capital
projects," but the suggested procedures fall short of those required by NEPA. 37 Fed. Reg.
22686 (1972). See also FRANK at 141. The Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC)
has adopted environmental guidelines but, like those of AID, they differ significantly from
those of NEPA. OPIC General Policy and Guidelines Eligibility of Project Environmental
Considerations, October 26, 1971, reprinted in FRANK, Appendix F. See also id. at 145.
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territorial scope of the impact statement requirement. Nor has
any court determined the ultimate scope of the impact statement
requirement, although two courts have concluded that NEPA
applies outside the United States to federal actions undertaken
in trust territories administered by the United States under trust
agreements with the United Nations.7"
The trend of opinion seems to be in the direction of applying
NEPA to international activities. The Council on Environmental
Quality"' has asked for impact statements on international activi-
ties which have their impacts primarily in other jurisdictions or
in international areas, and its Legal Advisory Committee has
concluded that the NEPA requirements concerning impact state-
ments should apply to Department of State and AID actions
carried out within the territorial jurisdiction of another nation,
both as a matter of law and as a matter of policy,7" and in fact
during 1974 several statements were prepared in the international
77. In People of Enewetak v. Laird, 353 F. Supp. 811 (D. Haw. 1973), the hereditary
and elected leaders of the people of the trust territory, the Enewetak Atoll, sued under
NEPA to enjoin the Department of Defense from conducting nuclear tests on the Atoll.
The court considered the applicability of NEPA outside the United States as an issue of
first impression and, reasoning that federal legislation applies to the trust territories only
if Congress manifests an intention that it should, found such an intention, relying upon
the facts that (a) the statute uses broad language and is not by its terms restricted to
United States territory delimited by the fifty states; (b) the statute clearly evidences a
concern for all persons subject to federal action, not just United States citizens in the fifty
states; (c) the legislative history shows Congress intended broad application and recog-
nized the worldwide scope of environmental problems, and (d) other recent federal envi-
ronmental legislation identifying areas where the laws are to be effective has included the
Trust Territory. The court specifically declined to rule on defendants' argument that while
NEPA applied to federal action in areas not under any nation's jurisdiction, it did not
apply to territories under the jurisdiction of a nation other than the United States. Id. at
817 n.10.
In People of Saipan v. Department of Interior, 502 F.2d 90 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied
43 U.S.L.W. 3525 (U.S. March 31, 1975), plaintiffs, citizens of the Trust Territory of the
Pacific Islands (Micronesia), brought suit under NEPA to enjoin certain actions of the
Trust Territory Government. While dismissing plaintiffs' NEPA claims on the ground
that the Trust Territory Government is not a "federal agency" subject to judicial review
under the Administrative Procedure Act or NEPA, the Ninth Circuit clearly held that
NEPA applies to federal agencies operating in the Trust Territory. Id. at 94-95.
78. The Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) is established under NEPA, 42
U.S.C. § 4321 (1970). Its functions are to advise the President, review and appraise federal
governmental programs in light of national environmental policy, undertake basic envi-
ronmental research and facilitate the implementation of NEPA's procedural require-
ments. It also prepares the annual Environmental Quality Report which the President is
required to submit to the Congress each year. 42 U.S.C. § 4341 (1970).
79. Legal Advisory Committee to the President's Council of Environmental Quality,
News Release, April 25, 1971 (Copy on file at office of Professor Grad, Columbia Univer-
sity).
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area." In addition, of the two congressional committees that
have overseen the implementation of NEPA, one, the House
Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, after careful con-
sideration rejected the Department of State's initial position that
impact in foreign jurisdictions is not covered by the statute.8 '
Further, it appears that federal agencies can be exempted from
filing an impact statement under NEPA only if there is a clear
conflict with the statutory authority which authorizes that
agency to perform its specialized functions.8 2 On policy grounds,
then, it is as advisable to apply NEPA to activities with impact
wholly or primarily in a foreign jurisdiction as to domestic activi-
ties. 3 The function of NEPA is merely to ensure that environmen-
tal consequences are fully considered. The filing of NEPA state-
ments for foreign-based activities not only will compel American
decision-makers to consider such consequences, but will also en-
sure that countries which receive aid are aware of the potential
environmental effects of a project so that they too can make in-
formed decisions.
CONCLUSION
Two related points inexorably emerge from an examination
of the use of national systems to help solve transnational prob-
lems. The first of these is that as international commerce and its
cross-frontier effects increase with the constant erosion of geo-
graphic barriers by advanced technology, it becomes more and
80. For example, the Department of State prepared an impact statement outlining
the United States' negotiating position at the United Nations Law of the Sea Conference
as well as an impact statement on United States alternatives to improve the quality of
Colorado River water that flows into Mexico. See Council on Environmental Quality,
ANNUAL REPORT 392 (1974). See also Frank at 138.
81. House Comm. on Merchant Marines and Fisheries, Administration of the Na-
tional Environmental Policy Act, H.R. REP. No. 316, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 33 (1971).
82. "Only when such specific obligations conflict with NEPA do agencies have a right
under § 104 . . . to dilute their compliance with the full letter and spirit of the Act."
Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109, 1115 n.12 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
83. See, e.g., Letter from William B. Macomber, Jr., Assistant Secretary for Congres-
sional Relations, Department of State, to Senator Henry M. Jackson, 21 April 1969, S.
REP. No. 91-296, Cal. No. 287, Appendix at 43-45 (on National Environmental Policy Act
of 1969).
[Tihe objective of the bill or, for that matter, of any proposition dedicated to
the protection of the national environment, cannot be effectively achieved un-
less it recognizes that existing ecosystems are interrelated by nature or by the
activities of man, and that the environmental forces affecting our national re-
sources disregard political and geographical frontiers.
Id. at 43.
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more important that nations provide, as an integral part of their
legal systems, the means for the redress of environmental injuries.
This entails providing both the jurisdictional means, such as long
arm statutes, for bringing the offender before the court, and the
domestic remedies to afford relief once the issues have been
joined. The second, and equally important need, is that aliens
who have been harmed by transnational events be permitted ac-
cess to the courts and the legal remedies of whatever nation has
the ability to effectuate the resolution of their claims. In both
respects, the American system is unusually efficacious, and its
distinctive methods of providing redress for both citizens and
aliens deserves serious consideration as a model for other national
systems.
The United States has set the strongest possible example for
the world by incorporating into its own governmental system a
concern for the environment which permeates all stages of the
decision-making process. It is extraordinarily significant that
even where economic or military considerations or energy impera-
tives are temporarily asserted to have assumed overriding import-
ance, the burden of justifying priorities, preliminarily at least, is
on those asserting the importance of these other considerations
rather than on those whose primary concern is the environment.
This shift in the burden of persuasion, as reflected in the proce-
dural requirements of NEPA and the substantive remedies pro-
vided by the Clean Air and Water Acts, not only reflects a re-
orientation in American environmental values, but the indica-
tions are that this new orientation is exportable.
In the past years it has become clear that environmental
impact statements have significant transnational uses and im-
plications. First, certain federal agencies such as the State De-
partment84 and the National Science Foundation85 prepared
guidelines covering certain of their activities abroad. Second,
impact statements have been prepared by the United States to
describe the international environmental effects of essentially
domestic actions, such as the Colorado River International Salin-
ity Control Project, affecting Mexico, and the Bureau of Recla-
mation's Garrison Diversion Project in North Dakota which may
cause water pollution problems in Canada." Such statements
84. See note 74 supra.
85. National Science Foundation, Circular No. 99, Rev. No. 2, § 6(b)(3) (February
28, 1974), cited in Council on Environmental Quality, ANNUAL REPoRT 399 (1974).
86. Council on Environmental Quality, ANNUAL REPORT 399 (1974).
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have also been prepared prior to the conclusion of international
agreements affecting the environment, for example, for the Con-
vention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping
Wastes and Other Matter, the Convention on International Trade
in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, the 1973 Con-
vention on the Prevention of Pollution from Ships and the Law
of the Sea Conference.8 These impact statements have allowed
environmentalists and other key interested and affected individu-
als and groups to evaluate and comment upon proposed interna-
tional agreements at important points in the ratification process.
Finally, impact statements have even played a significant role in
American diplomatic dealings with foreign governments, as when
the Atomic Energy Commission's statement on the 1971 Am-
chitka, Alaska nuclear explosion was provided to the govern-
ments of Canada and Japan."
Perhaps more significantly, however, such impact state-
ments have recently been adopted by Australia, Canada and Is-
rael, and other nations such as West Germany and the Soviet
Union have expressed considerable interest in adapting such pro-
cedure to their own legal and governmental systems and require-
ments. 9 This type of gradual dissemination of information and
techniques of environmental cooperation represents the greatest
hope for developing effective national environmental law sys-
tems, and ultimately, as individual nations reassess and reorder
national priorities in the direction of environmental protection,
for creating a viable international system for controlling and
avoiding abuses of the environment.
The development of such an international system must be a
vital goal for the immediate future. For whether the emphasis is
placed upon providing redress for injured individuals or upon
protecting natural resources, one essential fact must always be
kept in focus: we have moved into an era in which, environmen-
tally as well as politically and militarily, we have gone beyond the
point where the limited national concerns of even the most
powerful sovereign can be permitted the luxury of remaining the
only frame of reference within which environmental decisions are
made. If expanding technology is not accompanied by expanding
vision, and transnational environmental effects with transna-
tional environmental decision-making, no one will escape the
transnational tragedy which will inevitably follow.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
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